George Mickiewicz has over five decades of experience in the powder handling and dust processing industries. During this time, he’s seen a lot of success in combustible dust and he’s seen mistakes made -some of them tragic- generating lessons learned that he’s agreed to share on the podcast.
George’s career began in 1966, when he was a co-op student while studying to become a chemical engineer at the University of Detroit. He went on to spend 37 years with the same company before retiring in 2006. Today, he does part-time consulting for industry.
“The company I worked with is one that has dealt with this topic as a hazard since about 1965, when … a catastrophic consequence that led to the conclusion that the traditional safety systems and approach were not suitable to deal with process hazards,” George says. “To my recollection, it is the birth of what we call process safety management today. The company called it PSMR, which is process safety and risk management.”
Process Safety Management- the Early Years
George soon became proficient in the process safety management practices that officially became OSHA’s 1910.119 PSM in 1992. But when he started out in 1966, he did not have a lot to go on.
“I was working as a technician in a pilot plant that was developing different color toners. They were organic in nature and (the company knew) that it presented the dust explosivity hazard. But I don’t recall seeing the type of data that we get today, like minimal ignition, energy over explosivity levels, concentrations, MOCs, minimum oxygen concentrations, the KSTs, et cetera.”
There were explosion panels on these systems, which was his first introduction to the concept of injury and damage prevention.
“The information that we have today is significantly different from what we had five decades ago,” he acknowledges. “Unfortunately sometimes, the companies, once they install something, they think that they’re going to be okay and safe forever and ever. But as technology evolves, they don’t make the effort to stay with it. Not only the technology but also the regulation. What we’re seeing right now driven by the NFPA with the dust hazard analysis really is driven by the fact that industry really and truly should have done what is required of them now, many, many, many years ago.”
Lessons Not Being Learned
George says that management needs to ensure that lessons learned from fire and explosion incidents are properly implemented. He emphasizes that it takes resources to make positive change, but he sees them as an investment and not a cost, as recovering from a disaster costs significantly more than maintaining safe operations.
He also takes issue with the word ‘minor’ being used in a dust safety context.
“People talk about the word minor. This was a minor fire. It was a minor explosion. Well, in my mind, there is nothing that is minor, because what usually separates a minor from major is luck. So if companies don’t take a very close look at one of these situations in a thorough manner and really drill it down to the root cause and address that root cause, then it’s going to happen again.”
George recalled one incident where a ‘minor’ explosion occurred. When he met with the site team to go over what had happened, there was half an hour of discussions and agreements. At the end, as everyone was getting ready to leave, he asked them, “Gentlemen, in what you have done today, what is going to prevent this particular situation from recurring tomorrow?”
“There was dead silence,” he says, “and the leader of the team then said, “Okay, guys let’s get back.” Because what they had put in place was a series of administrative aspects and there was nothing from a process safety aspect improvement in terms of making changes to the process itself to prevent its return.”
In 1989, George investigated an incident at a facility that his company had taken over from a petrochemical company. An organic material in an FIBC (flexible intermediate bulk container, or super sack) was dumped into a vessel as the first step in the formation of a liquid product. One day, as the material was dropped, a dust explosion occurred and a fireball hit the operator who was discharging the material.
“(He) was very seriously burned: second and third degree burns that took several months of hospital care to recover from. He was airlifted to a burn center because the location we were at didn’t have one. It took several months for his recovery to take place.” Later on in the interview, George acknowledged that the employee involved and others that had seen the incident happen were impacted in ways that would affect them for life, demonstrating the seriousness of these types of hazards.
George led a team of experts who diagnosed the cause of the incident and recommended the installation of a rotary valve between the hopper and the tank. They also did some FIBC discharging work with Chilworth, which provided them with other means and mechanisms they could use in the future to prevent this type of occurrence. They also determined that fire-resistant coveralls could control the severity of any injuries should a similar event occur in the future.
Overcoming Resistance to Change
George recommended that ground-level personnel be involved in recommendation and adoption of safety measures. Doing so can overcome resistance and make progress.
“(It also) allows them to not only understand their process better but also allows them to contribute to the process because they know what’s going on in the field, where we don’t really have that intimate knowledge,” George says.
He pointed out that operators and maintenance personnel who work with the safety team can advocate for the changes with their co-workers.
“(They can say), “Hey guys, they’re not asking us to do this or that just for the sake of doing it. No, there is a real value. And the value is to make sure that nothing happens to you and that you can go home in a safe manner the same way you came in.”
Conclusion
George emphasized that the key to process safety is learning from mistakes and continuing to improve safety systems and standards.
“These standards were not perfect. I’m saying that the standards really were created on the basis of blood, bones and tears. In most cases, it was the learning from these tragic events.”
Resources mentioned
Dust Safety Science
Combustible Dust Incident Database
Dust Safety Science Podcast
Questions from the Community
Dust Safety Academy
Dust Safety Professionals
Organizations
NFPA
Standards
1910.119 PSM
Companies
Chilworth
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DSS111: Fifty Years in Dust Explosion and Fire Safety With George Mickiewicz | Part 1
